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3 come into effect soon. 18 In particular, this supposition is supported by the results of the subsidiarity and proportionality test outlining member states' opposition to the CCCTB proposal. 19 In fact, nine National Parliaments reacted swiftly (the lower house of the Czech Parliament belatedly) to the adoption of the proposal by the Commission and sent their reasoned opinions of the proposal's non-compliance with the principles of subsidiarity 20 and proportionality 21 . 22 This group included Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 23 Concerning their subsidiarity claim, they argue that the Commission failed to provide sufficient quantitative and qualitative evidence showing that member states were unable to remove fiscal impediments to cross-border activity on their own and that action at the EU level was necessary. 24 They hint at the additional compliance costs for businesses and administrative costs for member states that would come along with the introduction of an optional CCCTB, adding a 28 th domestic corporate tax system. Furthermore, they also claim that the proportionality principle has been violated. In their opinion, bilateral and unilateral measures, as well as informal coordination, suffice in addressing cross-border tax problems. Other member states disapprove of at least some parts of the CCCTB proposal. Among those are Belgium, France, Italy, Lithuania and Germany. 25 A way to circumvent the unanimity requirement of Art. 115 TFEU as the legal basis for the proposal is through the enhanced cooperation of a smaller group of interested member states. However, the utilization of this instrument is in turn subject to a range of conditions not easily met. 26 What's more, if several member states decide to move forward under the Lisbon Treaty articles on enhanced cooperation, it is more likely that they will attempt to introduce a CCTB in lieu of a CCCTB. The reason for this lies first and foremost in budgetary concerns. 27 Many member states fear a loss in tax revenues because of a bias in the consolidation and formula apportionment mechanism. Since intangible and financial assets are excluded from the formula, states with large service industries were put at a disadvantage, while those with labourintensive economies reap additional benefits. For instance, the Federal Government of Germany rejects a CCCTB, but welcomes a CCTB. 28 intend to introduce a common set of rules to determine the tax base by the year 2013. 29 Although some of the main objectives of the CCCTB project were not achieved this way  e.g. the elimination of the transfer pricing procedures, cross-border loss offsetting and simplification of cross-border restructuring  there would still be a worthwhile decrease in compliance and administrative costs, enhanced transparency concerning international investments and a disappearance of international double taxation and nontaxation due to divergent qualifications.
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B. Unitary taxation as a panacea? Some caveats Political feasibility is not the only thing that speaks against a CCCTB and for a CCTB; there is a range of other considerations as well. In fact, it is likely that international tax planning under a formula apportionment regime will only shift from transfer pricing to a tax-optimal geographic allocation and the manipulation of formula factors; 31 this is especially likely if national tax rates differ significantly, as intended by the CCCTB proposal.
32 Economic distortions and perceptions of unfairness will be the consequence, 33 all the more so when the same formula is applied to all industries. 34 It is very doubtful that factors can be selected to adequately represent the generation of income -factors that are under the influence of the taxpayer, but at the same time neither distort economic decisions nor are prone to manipulation. 35 The formula of the CCCTB proposal relies on three equally weighted microeconomic factors: labour 36 , assets 37 and sales 38 . 39 Each of these is susceptible to manipulation. 40 The labour factor could either be influenced by actively managing the exclusion or inclusion of the work force into the factor or by governing the geographical distribution of the work force. The capital factor is particularly vulnerable to manipulation of reference date, i.e. shifting parts of the tax base to low-tax member states by selling or purchasing assets within the group prior to the end of the tax year. The degree to which the sales factor 29 36 The labour factor is split equally between payroll costs and the number of employees (CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 90, para 1). 37 The asset factor consists of all fixed tangible assets owned, rented or leased by a group member; as a proxy for intangible assets, R&D, marketing and advertising costs in the six years prior to a company entering into the CCCTB are also to be included for five years (CCCTB proposal, art. 92). 38 The sales factor includes the proceeds of all sales of goods and supplies of services after discounts and returns (CCCTB proposal, art. 95, para. 2). 39 ibid, art. 86. 40 See Herzig, Teschke, Joisten (n 35) 339ff.
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5 can be manipulated depends on whether sales are recorded at destination or origin as it is more difficult to manipulate the country of destination than the country of origin. Needless to say, the CCCTB proposal contains a catalogue of countermeasures to prevent this kind of manipulation. For instance, the labor factor includes employees who, although not employed directly by a group member, perform tasks similar to those performed by direct employees. 41 Likewise, assets are computed as an average. 42 Sales are recorded at destination. 43 Nonetheless, precautions and anti-abuse rules like these increase complexity and will probably not be an airtight guarantee against manipulation, always leaving some leeway for tax planning. Hence, member states cannot be criticized for taking a "buyer beware approach" to formula apportionment.
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II. THE CCCTB PROPOSAL: COMMON TAX BASE 45
A. No linkage to financial accounting
The CCCTB proposal defines the tax base completely on its own. 46 In spite of the huge array of literature on aligning financial and tax accounting that has been published during the last decade, 47 it depends neither on a formal linkage nor on any other reference to national GAAP or IFRS / IAS.
48 Whilst reference to local GAAP had the advantage that recourse could be taken to already existing legislature and jurisprudence, a fragmentation of the tax base into 27 single systems would almost inevitably be the consequence, and 41 CCCTB proposal (n 1), art. 91 para. 3. 42 2 would thwart the aim of harmonization. 49 Therefore, such an approach should be rejected when simplification through harmonization is the main goal, as is the case with a CCTB. Although IFRS / IAS would provide a common reference point, they must be excluded for various other reasons. 50 For starters, the vast majority of European companies do not draw up annual IFRS / IAS accounts, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SME). 51 For these companies, it would probably be easier to adopt an entirely new tax base like the one outlined in the CCCTB proposal than to adjust to the complex system of IFRS / IAS. 52 In addition, the possibility of a private standardsetting body having an indirect effect on the tax base despite the comitology procedure clashes with the rule of law and the principle of democracy. 53 In similar fashion, the divergent goals of the IFRS / IAS and taxation seem irreconcilable. 54 Finally, and in the interest of IFRS / IAS themselves, the "tax pollution" of financial accounting should be fended off. 55 In conclusion, it is to be welcomed that the CCCTB proposal only bespeaks of an adoption of IFRS / IAS ideas deemed by the European Commission to be in line with the goals of the project: financial assets and liabilities held for trading (Art. 23), long-term contracts (Art. 24), provisions (Arts. 25, 26) and accounting for leases (Art. 36).
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B. Profit and loss approach
According to Art. 10 of the CCCTB proposal, the tax base is calculated as the difference between taxable revenues and deductible expenses as well as other deductible expenses. In accordance with Art. 17, revenues, deductible expenses and other deductible expenses shall in general be recognized when they accrue or are incurred. Two important conclusions can be drawn from this. First, profits are not determined on a cash basis.
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Instead there is a clear commitment to the accrual principle. 58 Second, the Commission chose the profit and loss approach over the balance sheet method. 59 The latter calculates taxable income by comparing the value of the assets in the balance sheet at the end of the period  plus dividends distributed 49 by the taxpayer and minus increases in capital during the year  with the value of net assets in the balance sheet at the end of the previous year.
60
Both approaches, the profit and loss technique and the balance sheet method, are in many respects similar and lead ceteris paribus to the same results. However, the balance sheet method usually starts with the financial accounts balance sheet, whereas the profit and loss method supposedly either uses the profit and loss account as a starting point or calculates revenues and expenses directly for tax purposes. 61 Although the tax base of the CCCTB proposal could in theory be calculated independently from financial accounting, in practice it is very likely that the balance sheet as well as the profit and loss account will serve as a starting point. 62 This assumption can be corroborated by an examination of the CCCTB proposal's explicit and implicit documentation requirements, to whose fulfillment especially the financial account balance sheet lends itself as a starting point. 63 For example, costs relating to acquisition, construction or improvement are not deductible in the year the asset is acquired, constructed or improved. Instead, only a proportional deduction may be made in respect of the depreciation of fixed assets 64 and costs related to non-depreciable assets are generally only deductible in the tax year in which the assets are disposed of. 65 These costs must thus be recorded. 66 Concerning stocks and work-in-progress, deductible expenses for a tax year shall be increased by the value of stocks and work-inprogress at the beginning of the tax year and reduced by the value of those at the end of the same tax year. 67 This way, the expenses relating to stocks and work-in-progress are only deductible when the latter are sold or used, again requiring an auxiliary calculation. Moreover, the same also applies to the simulation of the expense impact of provisions by Art. 25 of the CCCTB proposal. 68 Finally, it should be noted that the proposal tries to cover every aspect of the tax base, 69 which means that there are many tax-specific provisions necessitating modifications when adopting results from financial accounting. This includes rules on exempt revenues (Art. 11), non-deductible expenses (Art. 14), expenditure incurred for the benefit of shareholders (Art. 15), transactions between associated enterprises (Arts. 78-79) as well as anti-abuse rules (Arts. 80-83).
C. Role of principles
At one of the initial meetings of the CCCTB Working Group a working paper titled "General Tax Principles" was presented and discussed. 2 It outlined a wide range of general principles for the design and assessment of tax systems as well as specific tax accounting principles. At that time, the Working Group had decided to take an "informal approach" on this matter and not to formulate a catalogue of tax principles. 71 Later experts became uneasy when they realized that, without a minimum level of tax principles, countries would resort to the national GAAP whenever CCCTB legislation was incomplete or unclear.
72 This led to the insertion of Art. 9, which contains general tax principles to assist in the interpretation of the CCCTB proposal and to eliminate the need for national legislation and legal practice. Whether the four principles of Art. 9  the realization principle, the individual measurement of transactions and taxable events, consistency in the calculation of the tax base, the concept of tax years  can live up to these expectations remains to be seen. Principles play such a crucial role in achieving the goal of harmonization since a European Tax Court is not envisioned by the CCCTB proposal and common rules will be of no avail if their interpretation differs considerably under the auspices of national judges and tax inspectors. 73 The analysis of the extent to which overarching unwritten principles can be derived from the detailed rules of the proposal is at any rate an avenue for future research.
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III. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSAL IN LIGHT OF A CCTB WITHOUT CONSOLIDATION
A. Optionality & personal scope
Art. 6 of the proposal stipulates that the application of the CCCTB is optional. 75 Once the system has been successfully opted into, it has to be applied for a minimum period of five tax years. 76 On closer inspection one can find a multitude of pros and cons regarding optionality when discussing a CCCTB as well as a CCTB. 77 However, the balance between those arguments might change in light of a CCTB without consolidation and formula apportionment compared with a CCCTB. Whilst the CCCTB proposal provides optionality, the federal government of Germany for instance favours a CCTB that is mandatory. 78 The list of pros and cons of optionality can be divided into the positive and negative arguments that hold true for both a CCCTB and a CCTB and those that differ on this point. To the former group belongs the following line of argumentation.
79 Optionality minimizes the risk of a non-competitive system 80 85 To the latter group belong the following arguments. On the one hand, the positive argument that an optional system avoids the necessity of an opening clause to the formula apportionment procedure holds true only for a CCCTB since a CCTB does not feature formula apportionment. 86 On the other hand, the negative arguments that optionality would perpetuate profit-shifting opportunities 87 and increase the budget risks of cross-border consolidation 88 are likewise applicable only to a CCCTB and not to a CCTB. 89 Furthermore, the above arguments have to be weighted differently depending on whether optionality is evaluated with regard to a CCCTB or a CCTB regime. While with a CCCTB it might be argued that the strongest argument against optionality is the elimination of profit shifting and that the compliance costs issue does not weigh as heavily in comparison, 90 the optionality of a CCTB seems out of the question precisely due to the fact that this is the only way compliance costs can be reduced significantly, which is after all the main goal of a CCTB.A question closely related to optionality is the personal scope of a CCCTB / CCTB. 91 As its name suggests, the proposed CCCTB is limited to entities that are subject to corporate tax law, thus excluding partnerships that are flowthrough entities.
92 Henceforth, the system is not neutral regarding legal form. If it were mandatory, the only way out for companies would be to reorganize into partnerships. Even though this appears at first glance as a strong 81 This seems especially important when considering that at least according to the CCCTB proposal partnerships would not be eligible for a CCCTB/CCTB. 82 Nevertheless, member states could not prevent companies from opting for the new system. 83 A CCCTB / CCTB would add the 28 th system to the already existing 27 national ones. Taxpayers would face the highly complex decision whether they should opt or not. 84 The option requirements as well as the changes between systems would have to be controlled by tax authorities. Moreover, two sets of rules would have to be applied at the same time. 85 Although the five year minimum period hampers constant opting in and out and under a CCTB regime the opportunity of shopping between the national GAAP and the CCTB would not include the choice between unitary accounting and separate entity accounting as is the case with a CCCTB but be confined to a choice between two sets of rules determining the tax base. 86 However, the CCCTB proposal even contains an opening clause for cases where the application of the formula leads to an unreasonable allocation of the group's profits (Art. 86) although the regime would be optional. 87 A mandatory CCCTB would eliminate the problem of transfer price tax planning within the EU since intra-group transactions would be eliminated by means of consolidation, whereas an optional CCCTB would still leave the taxpayer with the choice to stick to separate entity accounting. 88 Taxpayers for which the CCCTB is advantageous will opt and those for which it is not will refrain from opting. 89 Hey (n 77) 104ff, 108. 90 ibid 111. 91 ibid 100ff. 92 CCCTB proposal, art. 1-3, Annexes I, II. Also see Staringer, 'Requirements for Forming a Group' in Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer (n 77) 120ff.
